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 Much of the research investigating ǯ
formal judgements could lead one to 
conclude that humans are 
fundamentally irrational in their 
decision making.  Is this a reasonable 
conclusion? 
By Damian E M Milton 
The ability to make rational decisions and to use logical reasoning has been studied since the Ancient 
Greeks.  The philosopher, Aristotle (cited in Oaksford, 2005), suggested that it was this faculty that 
separated humans from other animals.  On an everyday basis human beings have to make a number 
of decisions, yet it was not until the 1950 ?ƐƚŚĂƚ psychologists began to study this phenomenon with 
any intensity, largely due to the dominance of the behaviourist paradigm, in which behaviours were 
explained in terms of stimulus-response associations to external stimuli, and thus cognitive 
processes such as decision-making were not recognised.  This essay reviews more recent 
psychological research concerning decision-making, in order to establish whether or not humans are 
truly rational beings. 
The origins of decision research began in the disciplines of mathematics and economics, and rather 
than focusing on how decisions were made, these theories concentrated upon how decisions should 
be made ideally.  Early cognitive psychological research was influenced by these theories, on the 
assumption that the objective of decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐǁĂƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞ ‘ďĞƐƚ ?ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚďǇ
some method, ƚŚĞďĞƐƚ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ?ǇƚŽŶ ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Ayton (2005) categorises psychological theories of decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ? ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵŐŚƚ ?ƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ
examine how people make decisions.  By posing such a distinction, he suggests that human decision-
making is faulty in some way, yet also states that it should not be assumed from this, that human 
beings are in some way incapable of making rational choices that help them to live their lives. 
 Many decisions involve making a choice where the probable outcome is not known in advance; 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƐĞƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌŝƐŬĂŶĚĂƌĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ŐĂŵďůĞƐ ? ?^ƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ
expected utility theory (SEU), applies a normative model to choices involving risk.  By taking a 
descriptive decision analysis approach, the SEU of von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, cited in 
ǇƚŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ Ă ŵŽĚĞů ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚƌĞĞ ?, based on visual representations, 
modelling the probabilities and utilities of the possible outcomes associated with possible 
alternative paths of action.   According to SEU, if an individual making a decision, breaks one of four 
main principles (or axioms), then they will not maximise utility, and so would not be basing decisions 
on normative standards (Ayton, 2005).  These axioms are:  ‘Comparability ?, where an individual must 
be able to show a preference between two alternative outcomes;  ‘dransitivity ?, meaning choices 
should be ĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ‘ŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĐŚŽice is better in 
at least one respect, and at least good or better in every other respect, to other available options; 
 ‘/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂŶŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŝƐƵŶĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞŵĂĚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚinfluence 
the choice made ?ĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇ ‘/ŶǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĂŶŽƉƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůd be independent 
of how it is portrayed. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986, cited in Ayton, 2005) found however, that people often transgress 
these axioms in everyday decision-making.  Therefore, people do not act according to how 
normative theory would prescribe.  Implying either that something is going astray in the way people 
make choices, or normative theory does not capture how people come to make decisions, or both.  
Slovic and Liechtenstein (1968, cited in Ayton, 200 ? ? ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƌĞǀĞƌƐĂů
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶĂĐŚŽŝĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐĂŵďůĞƐ ?ŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞǁĞƌĞůĞƐƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
probabilities and more concerned with the attractiveness of a potential winning of a gamble.  
Indeed, one need only look as far as the money spent every week on the National Lottery to see 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? Tversky et al. (1988) found that in comparisons between 
matching tasks involving the assigning of values and those involving a choice between integers; that 
people were more likely to choose on the basis of the prominence of an attribute, in the latter 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?dǀĞƌƐŬǇĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚĚƵĞƚŽ
the qualitative reasoning involved in making decisions between already available choices, whilst 
matching tasks require a more quantitative appraisal, with less emphasis being placed on the 
relative importance of the attributes.  Hsee (1998, cited in Ayton, 2005) also found a  ‘preference 
reversal difficulty ? ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞǀĂůƵĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŽĨ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ǁŚĞŶ ǀĂůƵĂƚĞĚ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ
separately or jointly.  For example, if one had to choose whether or not to buy an item in a shop that 
sells a multitude of similar options, or in a shop where it is the only available item of its kind. 
 In making choices between available options, Shafir (1993, cited in Ayton, 2005) found that when 
trying to select an option, people tend to focus on the positive features of making that choice, yet 
when asked to reject a choice; people tend to focus on negative aspects of the potential choice.  
Thus, rather than ranking choices, people tend to look for reasons to support a choice. 
It can be seen from the above evidence, that human choices are not predictable by the use of 
normative theory such as SEU.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979, cited in Ayton, 2005) proposed a 
descriptive model of decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ^hŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ to 
ŶŽƚ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ  ‘ŝĚĞĂů ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?  ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞs can be broken down into two 
ƉŚĂƐĞƐ ?ĨŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ĂŶ ‘ĞĚŝƚŝŶŐ ?ƉŚĂƐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ?ŶĞŐůŝŐŝďůĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐĂƌĞ
selected out, whilst other aspects retain prominence and are used as a reference point to weigh up 
 ‘ŐĂŝŶƐ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ‘ůŽƐƐĞƐ ?in the second phase of decision-making.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979, cited 
in Ayton, 2005) also showed how prospect theory could predict phenomena, where SEU had failed.  
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĨƌĂŵĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ŐĂŝŶ ?Žƌ ‘ůŽƐƐ ? ?people will be more or less likely 
to be risk averse and will make different decisions on this basis. 
ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ <ĂŚŶĞŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ dǀĞƌƐŬǇ  ?ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ ǇƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ ŽĨ
ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĞƌƌŽƌƐŝŶũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚďĞůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽ ‘ŵĞŶƚĂůŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ?Žƌ ‘ƌƵůĞƐ
ŽĨ ƚŚƵŵď ? ? ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶĚ ƵƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƐŝŵƉůŝĨǇ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making processes.  These simplifications, 
therefore, were not normative, but applied simplistic principles that could be processed quickly.  
According to Kahneman et al. (1982, cited in Ayton, 2005), due to the limited processing capacity of 
the brain, these strategies are needed to lessen the complexity of decisions.  These heuristics 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŐŶŽƌĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ the 
ƉƌŝŽƌƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŵĂĚĞ ? ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĨĂůů ĐǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
two events is estimated to be more likely than one of the same events alone, which violates simple 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŚĞƵƌŝstic, whereby individuals estimate the probable 
frequency of an event, by using similar prior instances that can easily be brought to mind, yet may 
not represent probability, but ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůƐĂůŝĞŶĐĞŽƌƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶĐŚŽƌĂŶĚĂĚũƵƐƚ ?
heuristic, where judgements of subsequent value are biased by judgements of initial value.  
Goldstein and Girgerenzer (2002, cited in Ayton, 2005) criticised previous research for using 
contrived laboratory techniques and lack of ecological validity, and studied naturally occurring 
ŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞǇĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĞŵƉůŽǇƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐ  ‘ĨĂƐƚĂŶĚĨƌƵŐĂů ?
heuristics in order to be able to make quick decisions that can be functional and accurate within 
natural settings. 
 A review of behavioural decision research was conducted by Maule and Hodgkinson (2002), where a 
number of studies were referenced to show that these heuristic errors not only occur amongst 
economically inexperienced undergraduate research participants, but also in the judgements of 
business executives, therefore mistakes of this nature can have a profound effect on the wider social 
world.  The level of evidence to show how people use simple heuristics in decision-making, suggests 
that one cannot establish an accurate theory of human decision-making on normative theory 
adapted from economic and mathematical theorems.  According to Ayton (2005) however, just 
because humans are not perfect processors of information, this does not show that humans are 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ  ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ? ĂƐ ĂŶy standard of rationality should accept that the computational 
requirements of normative theory are generally beyond the capacity of a human being making 
everyday decisions.  &ŽƌǇƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ? ‘ďŽƵŶĚĞĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐ
 ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŽƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂ ? 
 “ ? ? ?ǁĞ ŶĞĞĚ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŽ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ŬŶŽĐŬ ĚŽǁŶƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĂǁ ŵĂŶ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
ŵŽĚĞůƐ ? ? ?ǇƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
The question remains however, as to how humans can be as competent as they are in navigating 
their environments, whilst being so fallible in regard to making errors of judgement due to heuristics 
and biases.  Chase et al. (1998) however, question whether rationality should be defined as behaving 
ŝŶ Ă  ‘ůŽŐŝĐĂů ? ǁĂǇ ƚŽ ŵĂximise rewards in a formal test.  For Chase et al. (1998), both normative 
ŵŽĚĞůƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ-and-ďŝĂƐĞƐ ?ǀŝĞǁďŽƚŚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĞŶĞƚƐŽĨ
probability theory, and confuse irrationality with the human ability to make inferences of a semantic 
and pragmatic nature from their social and ecological environments.  Chase et al. (1998) argue that 
ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ĨĂŝůƐ ƚŽ ŐƌĂƐƉ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ? /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶĚ ŚĂƐ
evolved to adapt to natural surroundings and not mathematical problem-solving. 
In order to find out how the human mind makes decisions under bounded conditions, it can be 
argued that researchers will need to look at how humans interact within social and physical 
environments in order to attain goals.  By looking at the social and ecological aspects of rationality, 
psychologists such as Chase et al. (1998) have begun to redefine what it is to be rational.  In 
conclusion, whether humans are considered rational or not, depends on how one defines rationality.  
If rationality refers to making appropriate decisions given physical and social constraints, rather than 
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